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Abstract
Prior to the Asian nancial crisis, most Asian exchange rates were de facto pegged
to the US Dollar. In the crisis, many economies experienced a brief period of extreme

exibility. A `fear of 
oating' gave reduced 
exibility when the crisis subsided, but

exibility after the crisis was greater than that seen prior to the crisis. Contrary to
the idea of a durable Bretton Woods II arrangement, Asia then went on to slowly
raise 
exibility and reduce the role for the US Dollar. When the period from April
2008 to December 2009 is compared against periods of high in
exibility, from January
1991 to November 1991 and October 1995 to March 1997, the increase in 
exibility
is economically and statistically signicant. This paper proposes a new measure of
dollar pegging, the \Bretton Woods II score". We nd that by this measure Asia has
been slowly moving away from a Bretton Woods II arrangement.
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21 The exchange rate regime in Asia
Questions connected with the exchange rate regime have been an important part of under-
standing macroeconomic policies and outcomes in Asia. In the period leading up to the
Asian crisis of 1997, many Asian economies had highly in
exible exchange rates. In the
aftermath of the Asian crisis, while many economies announced reforms of the exchange
rate regime, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) pointed out that there was a substantial dierence
between the de jure and de facto exchange rate regime, and that many economies had gone
back to a high degree of exchange rate in
exibility after the crisis.
A substantial research eort tried to understand the sources of this `fear of 
oating'. Some
hypotheses which have been oered include the desire to reduce the currency risk faced
by corporations with currency mismatches and incomplete nancial markets, and the de-
sire to stabilise domestic in
ation in a small open economy with substantial exchange rate
passthrough.1 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003) have hypothesised the emer-
gence of an Asian-led `Bretton Woods II' regime motivated by exchange rate mercantilism.
Some economists have argued that central bank actions aimed at exchange rate underval-
uation should be an integral part of the optimal growth strategy in developing economies
(Rodrik, 2008). Other researchers have argued that there is little evidence about a causal
impact of exchange rate undervaluation on growth in the long run(Woodford, 2009).
The macroeconomic policy framework in some Asian countries has involved a certain in-
terlocking set of features: exchange rate in
exibility, large current account surpluses, and
the accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves. This has led to concerns about global
imbalances. The resolution of these imbalances may be critically linked to modifying the
exchange rate regime in some Asian economies (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004).
In parallel, there has been interest in questions about the role of the US dollar (usd) in
Asian exchange rate arrangements as opposed to the Euro (eur), the Yen (jpy) and the
British Pound (gbp). To the extent that Asian economies have moved away from the usd,
how important have these other major international currencies become?
In this setting, the following four questions are of interest:
1. In the period immediately after the Asian crisis, did Asian economies go back to pre-crisis
levels of exchange rate 
exibility?
2. Did Asian economies then evolve into a durable `Bretton-Woods II' arrangement, featuring
exchange rate in
exibility and pegging to the usd?
3. To what extent have Asian exchange rate regimes shifted focus from the usd to the eur,
the jpy and the gbp?
1These hypotheses have been documented in Eichengreen and Hausman (1999); Hausmann, Gavin,
Pages-Serra, and Stein (1999); Patnaik and Shah (2010 (forthcoming).
34. To what extent did exchange rate regimes encounter abrupt change in the global nancial
crisis of 2008, when compared with the experience of 1997?
In this paper, we oer new evidence on these questions. The role of the dollar as a
predominant international currency to which Asian countries peg is explicitly explored.
We propose a `Bretton Woods II Score'. Prior to the Asian crisis, the average bw-II Score
was high. The score dropped sharply during the crisis and rose again after it. However,
after 2006 the score declined. This suggests that Asia has slowly moved away from the
tight dollar pegging.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology
used to measure the ne structure of exchange rate regimes in Asia, and obtain dates of
structural change of the exchange rate regime. Section 3 analyses the results obtained
by measurement and dating of the de facto currency regime in each economy, in order to
address the four questions enumerated above. Detailed results for each of the 11 economies
have been placed in an appendix, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
The importance of measuring the de facto exchange rate regime has motivated research
on data-driven methods for the classication of exchange rate regimes. This literature
has attempted to create datasets identifying the exchange rate regime in operation for
all economies in recent decades, using a variety of alternative heuristic procedures.(Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005; Reinhart and Rogo, 2004; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002)
For instance, Reinhart and Rogo (2004) use a variety of descriptive statistics to classify
the exchange rate regime. They classify the exchange rate regime as a crawling peg when
the probability that the monthly nominal exchange rate (typically to the usd) is within
1% over a rolling ve year period is above 80%. Reinhart and Rogo (2004) also create
a classication with seven types of exchange rate regimes.2 In similar fashion, Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2005) classify countries into three regimes { 
oat, intermediate and xed
{ by examining the volatility of exchange rates.
In terms of the range of dates covered, Calvo and Reinhart (2002); Reinhart and Rogo
(2004); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) analyse exchange rate regimes till 2002, 2003
and 2004 respectively.3 In order to examine more recent events, the imf de facto clas-
sication of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks is useful in that it
is regularly updated. While it is available from 1998 onwards, a revised system for the
2The categories are: peg, band, crawling peg, crawling band, moving band, managed 
oat and free 
oat.
This is similar to the International Monetary Fund's (imf) areaer classication. The ne classication
within these coarse categories is also available on their website.
3Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogo have extended the database using the method in Reinhart and Rogo
(2004) till December 2007.
4classication has been adopted (Habermeier, Kokenyne, Veyrune, and Anderson, 2009),
which hinders comparisons with the previous years.
The estimation strategy used in this paper (Zeileis, Shah, and Patnaik, 2010 (forthcoming)
builds on this literature in three respects. Exchange rate 
exibility is measured as a real
number from 0 (very high 
exibility) to 1 (hard peg). Structural change in the exchange
rate regime is addressed using a sound inferential strategy which yields estimates of break
dates to the resolution of the week. Finally, the econometric computations are easily
redone using current data, allowing for easy updation of the de facto exchange rate regime
database, thus permitting the analysis of current questions.
The point of departure for this strategy is a linear regression model based on cross-currency
exchange rates (with respect to a suitable numeraire). Used at least since Haldane and Hall
(1991), this model was popularized by Frankel and Wei (1994) (and is hence also called
the Frankel-Wei model). Recent applications of this estimation strategy include B enassy-
Qu er e, Coeur e, and Mignon (2006), Shah, Zeileis, and Patnaik (2005) and Frankel and Wei
(2007). An independent currency, such as the Swiss Franc (chf), is chosen as an arbitrary























This regression picks up the extent to which the inr/chf rate 
uctuates in response to

uctuations in the usd/chf rate. If there is pegging to the usd, then 
uctuations in the
gbp, jpy and eur will be irrelevant, and we will observe 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 while 2 = 1.
The R2 of this regression is also of interest; values near 1 suggest reduced exchange rate

exibility.4
The choice of currencies in the regression analysis re
ects the core international currencies
in the global nancial system. The Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves (cofer)
database maintained by the imf suggests that more than 83% of the world's reserves have
always been held in usd, eur (formerly dem), gbp and jpy. Maintained since 1995,
the cofer database has 140 economies reporting composition of reserves. Since 2000,
an average of 97.8% of world reserves reported to the imf have been held in these four
currencies.
To understand the de facto exchange rate regime in a given economy for a given time
period, this ols regression can be utilised. In order to address change in the exchange
4The Deutsche Mark is used as a proxy for the Euro in the older data. Hence, the term `dur' is used
instead of `eur', to convey the concatenation of the time-series of dem/chf rates followed by the eur/chf
rates.
5Table 1 The de jure exchange rate regime in Asia after 1999
Economy Period Exchange rate regime
China 1999{2005 Peg to usd
2005{ Crawling peg to basket
India 1993{ Managed 
oat
Korea 1999{ Free 
oat
Malaysia 1999{2005 Peg to usd
2005{ Managed 
oat
Singapore 1999{ Band, basket, crawl
Indonesia 1999{ Managed 
oat
Philippines 1999{ Managed 
oat
Taiwan 1999{ Managed 
oat
Hong Kong 1999{ Linked exchange rate system
Thailand 1999{ Managed 
oat
Vietnam 1999{ Target band around exchange rate
Source: imf areaer - various issues.
rate regime, estimation with rolling data windows can be used to obtain an informal sense
of how parameters have changed through time. However, this strategy lacks a formal
inferential framework for determining changes in the parameters.
The econometrics of structural change can be applied to the analysis of structural change in
the Frankel-Wei model. Zeileis, Shah, and Patnaik (2010 (forthcoming) extend the familiar
Perron-Bai methodology (Bai and Perron, 2003) for identifying dates of structural change
in an ols regression to a more general mle setting, which identies structural change in
the full parameter vector  = (;). Through this, dates of structural change in the
exchange rate regime are identied.
In this paper, we apply this estimation strategy to eleven Asian economies: China, In-
dia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
and South Korea. Table 1 shows the de jure exchange rate regime in operation in these
economies. A dataset of weekly currency returns is collated for a period of 18 years, run-
ning from January 01, 1991 to December 25, 2009.5 Dates of structural breaks in the
exchange rate regime are then identied. In each sub-period, the regression R2 serves as a
summary statistic about exchange rate 
exibility. Values near 1 convey tight pegs, while

oating rates prove to have values of 0.3 to 0.4. This strategy has three advantages:
1. We are able to measure and quantify the ne structure of intermediate regimes, with a
real-valued measure of exchange rate in
exibility, the regression R2.
2. Sharp dates are obtained, at which the exchange rate regime changed. We implement these
methods using weekly percentage changes of exchange rates, which yields break dates to
the resolution of the week. Through this, for each economy, a time-series of exchange rate
5For Vietnam, the data starts from June 25, 1993.
6Table 2 An example: Korea
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 1995-01-20 0.98 1.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.07
(60.98) (-0.08) (-0.68) (-0.99)
2 1995-01-27 1997-11-14 0.83 0.87 -0.06 0.07 0.16 0.42
(13.65) (-0.55) (1.03) (3.75)
3 1997-11-21 1998-09-11 0.15 -1.03 1.27 1.17 -0.09 7.58
(-1.61) (0.87) (1.85) (-0.29)
4 1998-09-18 2006-05-19 0.70 0.63 0.18 0.06 0.31 0.81
(14.66) (1.95) (1.16) (10.43)
5 2006-05-26 2008-02-22 0.79 0.84 0.33 0.01 -0.15 0.27
(11.91) (2.10) (0.19) (-2.07)
6 2008-02-29 2009-12-25 0.28 0.44 0.52 0.12 -0.27 3.10
(2.78) (2.11) (1.10) (-2.46)

exibility is obtained, of the value of the R2 which prevailed at a point in time. With
estimates in hand for each economy at every point in time, it is easy to compute summary
statistics about Asia by averaging these parameters.
3. The number of breaks and the placement of breaks is based on sound inference procedures
and can be readily recomputed to utilise current data, and thus address current research
questions..
At every point in time, our methodology yields a parameter vector (;;R2) that prevails
for each economy. These parameters are averaged across the 11 economies to obtain a
location estimator for Asia. Given the small samples, we use bootstrap estimation to obtain
condence intervals. In order to obtain more accurate results, the adjusted bootstrap
percentile method is used, which corrects for bias and skewness of the bootstrap distribution
(Davison, Hinkley, and Schechtman, 1986).
3 Results
3.1 An example: Korea
As an example of this methodology, Table 2 shows the results for Korea. Over the 18 years
of data analysed, six distinct sub-periods are identied. For each sub-period, the rst row
in the table shows parameter estimates and the next row presents the t statistic.
In the early period (from 11 January 1991 onwards), the Korean Won was pegged to
the usd. The R2 was 0.98, the usd coecient was 1.01 and the other coecients were
insignicant.
On 27 January 1995, Korea moved towards greater 
exibility with a drop in the R2 to
0.83. The extent of pegging to the usd also declined with a coecient of 0.87, and a
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small weightage for the jpy is visible. These estimates for the rst and second periods are
consistent with evidence for pre-crisis Korea such as Fukuda (2002).
During the Asian crisis, Korea experienced a dramatic change in the exchange rate regime
starting from 21 November 1997, where the R2 dropped to 0.15. The coecients on the
usd, the eur and the jpy are not signicant while the coecient on the gbp was signicant
at a 10% level.
From 18 September 1998 onwards, there was a reversion to an intermediate regime, with
an R2 of 0.70, a coecient of 0.63 for the usd, and coecients of 0.18 and 0.31 for the
eur and the jpy respectively. Even though de jure in
ation targeting was put into place,
South Korea seems to have implemented a basket peg and intervened heavily in the Won-
Dollar market. While Korea did exhibit a `fear of 
oating' after the crisis subsided, it did
not go back to extent of exchange rate rigidity of either Period 1 (R2 = 0:98) or Period 2
(R2 = 0:83).
Between 26 May 2006 and 22 February 2008, the basket peg changed, with the weight
on the usd increasing from 0.63 in the previous period to 0.84. The coecient on the
jpy dropped sharply.
On 29 February 2008, Korea shifted to a 
oating exchange rate regime with an R2 of 0.28.
This date of structural break was sixteen days before the failure of Bear Stearns and well
before the Lehman crisis.
Figure 1 shows the time-series of the krw-usd exchange rate, with vertical lines showing
the estimated break dates.
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3.2 The exchange rate regime in Asia
Detailed estimation results for all economies have been placed in the Appendix. In the
remainder of this paper, we focus on summary statistics about Asia as a whole, in order
to obtain insights into the Asian exchange rate regime. Figure 2 shows the mean of the
R2 values across all economies, along with the bootstrapped 95% condence interval. A
series of previous papers (Krugman, 1999; Edwards, 2001; Tiwari, 2003; Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger, 2005; Reinhart and Rogo, 2004) have found that Asia had little currency

exibility prior to the Asian crisis, and got back towards in
exibility after the crisis sub-
sided. Our point estimates support these arguments, and give numerical estimates and
statistical inference for both phenomena. Prior to the Asian crisis, the mean R2 was as
high as 0.947. While 
exibility rose in the crisis, once the crisis subsided, the mean R2
showed greater 
exibility when compared with pre-crisis conditions, with a point estimate
of 0.834.
In the period from January 2000 to March 2008, the average R2 was at 0.854. While the
term `Bretton Woods II' was coined in this period, two aspects contradict the hypothesis
of a durable Bretton Woods II system: (a) the mean R2 peaked between March 2003 and
March 2004 and has generally declined since, and (b) exchange rate 
exibility did not
revert to the extremes of the pre-crisis period.
The last period in the graph { from April 2008 to December 2009 { has a mean R2 of
0.734. The null hypothesis of no-change in the mean R2 can be rejected at a 95% level of
signicance when this is compared against two preceeding periods of high in
exibility: the
period from January 1991 to November 1991 when the mean R2 was 0.947 and the period
from October 1995 to March 1997 when the mean R2 was 0.935.
9Figure 3 Empirical cumulative distribution of R2







































KS test statistic:  0.693
Prob value:  0.0117
In the previous case, the rejection of the null hypothesis of no-change applies not just for
the mean: it applies for the entire distribution also. We apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test to compare the cross-sectional distribution of R2 in 1991 against that seen in 2009.
The null hypothesis that the distribution of the R2 across countries is identical between
1991 and 2009 is rejected with a p-value of 0.0117. This provides evidence of stochastic
dominance of the distribution in 1991 over the distribution in 2009 (Figure 3).
This evidence also shows that in the Asian crisis of the mid 1990s, currency 
exibility rose
sharply as pegged exchange rates broke down. There has been no comparable movement
in the global crisis of 2008.
Figure 4 turns to the role of the four major international currencies in the exchange rate
regime of Asian economies. Large values for the usd coecient characterise the entire
period. At the same time, in the most recent period from April 2008 to December 2009,
the mean value for the usd coecient stood at 0.757. There is no overlap in the 95%
condence interval for the mean when we compare this against the pre-Asian-crisis period
from October 1995 to June 1997. The hypothesis of no-change can thus be rejected.
Contrary to a Bretton-Woods II (bw-II) hypothesis, the picture we see is that of a slow
decline in the role of the usd in Asian exchange rate regimes.
In order to analyse the bw-II hypothesis, we construct an `Bretton Woods II Score' as
the average of the R2 and the usd coecient.6 Values close to 1.0 are consistent with a
bw-II behaviour, while lower values suggest a shift away from this.
Prior to the Asian crisis, the average bw-II Score was 0.9104 between March 1991 and
6Hong Kong SAR has been left out of this analysis given the nature of their exchange rate regime.


































1995 2000 2005 2010
Mean USD coefficient




























1995 2000 2005 2010
Mean EUR coefficient

































1995 2000 2005 2010
Mean GBP coefficient





























1995 2000 2005 2010
Mean JPY coefficient
 95% Confidence Interval














































1995 2000 2005 2010
Table 3 Ranking economies based on bw-II score
1991 to 1997 1997 to 1999 1999 to 2007 2007 to 2009
China 1 1 2 1
Vietnam 3 2 3 2
Taiwan 6 5 6 3
Philippines 10 4 5 4
Malaysia 7 6 1 5
India 8 3 4 6
Singapore 9 7 7 7
Thailand 5 10 8 8
Indonesia 2 8 10 9
Korea 4 9 9 10
March 1997; the score dropped dramatically during the crisis and returned to an average
of 0.8347 between July 1999 and December 2006. The score in the last period, January
2007 to December 2009, stood at 0.7535. The decline in the bw-II Score is statistically
signicant with no overlap in condence intervals between the rst and the last period.
This suggests that Asia has slowly moved away from the bw-II arrangement (Figure 5).
Countries can be ranked, in any period, by the values seen for the average bw-II score.
Table 3 shows these ranks. Big increases in these rank through the entire period are
visible for Thailand, Indonesia and Korea. In the last period, the top four countries with
bw-II behaviour were China, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines.
Alongside this shift away from the bw-II arrangement, there has been an important rise of
the eur in Asia's exchange rate regimes. From December 1997 onwards, the lower bound
of the 95% condence interval for the mean value of the eur coecient has exceeded 0.05.
In the latest period from April 2008 onwards, the 95% condence interval runs from 0.133
to 0.336 with a point estimate for the mean of 0.220.
In the case of the gbp, until December 2001, H0 : 3 = 0 could not be rejected. From
that date onwards, a small coecient with a point estimate of 0.029 has emerged, where
12H0 can be rejected at a 95% level of signicance.
There was a period from April 1994 till August 2005 where with the jpy, H0 : 4 = 0
could be rejected. The point estimate for the jpy was as high as 0.159 in October 1997.
In this period, the jpy had achieved a certain role as an international currency. But the
point estimate has declined through time, and in the recent period from August 2005 to
December 2009, H0 : 4 = 0 cannot be rejected.
To summarise, our ndings conrm the incidence of tight usd pegging before the Asian
crisis. After the Asian crisis, Asia returned to a regime of high in
exibility (fear of 
oating).
But this was not as in
exible as that prevailing before the crisis. In the following years,
there is some evidence of the in
exibility and dollar pegging that has been made prominent
by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003). However, there is early evidence of Asia
moving towards greater 
exibility, and a certain shift away from the usd towards the
gbp and strongly towards the eur, though not towards the jpy. The evidence suggests a
brief period in which the jpy played an important role in Asian currency arrangements,
but after that the role of the jpy has subsided.
3.3 Sensitivity analyses
We perform three robustness checks on the main results:
1. GDP weights instead of equal weights when averaging across economies.
2. An alternative location estimator { the trimmed mean { to avoid the undue in
uence of
extreme values on the sample mean.
3. Addition of other 
oating currencies in the Frankel-Wei regression
Does the use of equal weights for all economies make our results biased in favour of small
economies? To answer this question, we weight economies by gdp. Figure 6 superposes
the mean R2 value using equal weights with one that uses gdp weights. gdp weighted R2
data suggests greater in
exibility because of the presence of China which has a large gdp
and an in
exible exchange rate. However, the dierence between the two series is small,
particularly in recent years.
Figure 7 plots the trimmed mean alongside the ordinary mean. There is a small dierence
between the two in the recent past. Our results are hence not an artifact of extreme values.
Does the addition of other 
oating currencies in the Frankel-Wei regression change the
results? Regression analysis with Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar, only with
the Australian dollar, and only with the Canadian dollar does not alter the measure of

exibility (R2) or the break-dates. However, it does alter the coecient on each currency
due to the correlation structure between the independent variables.
13Figure 6 Exchange rate 
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Figure 7 Exchange rate 

















In this paper, a new strategy for measurement of the de facto exchange rate regime has
been brought to bear on questions about the Asian exchange rate regime.
As has been widely observed in the literature, the Asian Crisis of the mid 1990s was
preceded by a period of acute exchange rate in
exibility. In our results, the average R2
was 0.916 from January 1991 till June 1996.
During the Asian crisis, 
exibility rose sharply. As has been widely observed in the litera-
ture, once the crisis subsided, Asia returned to signicant in
exibility. However, our point
estimates show that the mean R2 after the crisis was at 0.833, which implies somewhat
greater 
exibility when compared with the pre-crisis environment. From 2000 onwards,
while Asia was characterised as having a `Bretton Woods II' conguration, exchange rate
in
exibility was not at pre-crisis levels.
From March 2004 onwards, the point estimator for the mean R2 has consistently declined.
In the latest period, from April 2008 to December 2009, the point estimate stood at 0.734.
When this period is compared against the pre-crisis period from October 1995 to June 1997,
the null hypothesis of no change can be rejected at a 95% level of signicance. Hence, the
picture is one where Asia is slowly moving towards greater 
exibility.
In the Asian crisis of the mid 1990s, currency 
exibility rose sharply as pegged exchange
rates broke down. There has been no comparable movement in the global crisis of 2008.
Underlying the location estimators there is signicant heterogeneity amongst Asian economies.
China and Hong Kong have adopted pegged and linked exchange rate regimes respectively.
Economies like India have an exchange rate regime that is more intermediate in character.
Korea and Indonesia have de facto moved to a 
oating exchange rate regime. Appendix
A presents detailed results for each Asian economy documenting the heterogeneity in de
facto exchange rate regimes in Asia.
In terms of the role of the four major currencies, there has been a signicant decline in the
role of the usd, from a pre-crisis average coecient of 0.918 to a current value of 0.789.
The null hypothesis of no-change is rejected at a 95% level of signicance. There has been
a strong rise of the eur and a small role for the gbp. While the average jpy coecient
was positive from April 1994 to April 2005, in the following period the null hypothesis of
zero cannot be rejected.
The \Bretton Woods II Score" suggests that Asia was tightly pegged to the dollar in the
pre-Asian crisis years and for some years after the crisis. However, since 2006 Asia has
moved away from tight pegging to the US dollar.
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17A Appendix
A.1 Vietnam
The Vietnamese Dong was tightly pegged to the usd between 1994-09-16 and 2008-03-14 with the
R2 value ranging from 0.96 to 1 with the exception of the period from March 1997 to December
1997 where the R2 stood at 0.66. However, since 21 March 2008, the Dong has become more

exible with an R2 of 0.86, similar to the de facto arrangement in the rst period between
1993-06-25 and 1994-09-09.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1993-06-25 1994-09-09 0.86 0.86 0.01 0.31 -0.06 0.36
(9.07) (0.10) (2.50) (-0.88)
2 1994-09-16 1996-04-12 0.99 0.99 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(75.33) (-0.25) (-0.09) (1.28)
3 1996-04-19 1997-03-14 0.96 1.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.06
(18.63) (-0.25) (0.65) (-0.43)
4 1997-03-21 1997-12-19 0.66 1.09 -0.24 -0.07 0.12 0.95
(5.17) (-0.78) (-0.37) (1.05)
5 1997-12-26 1999-02-05 1.00 1.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
(288.85) (-0.82) (-2.08) (-1.09)
6 1999-02-12 1999-08-13 0.93 0.92 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.12
(11.44) (0.70) (0.07) (0.41)
7 1999-08-20 2007-08-03 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(227.29) (0.05) (0.54) (0.75)
8 2007-08-10 2008-03-14 0.99 0.92 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.02
(31.71) (0.98) (1.00) (-0.93)
9 2008-03-21 2009-12-25 0.86 0.97 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.32
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18A.2 China
The de jure crawling peg of the renminbi was announced on 22 July 2005. Although the claim is
that the Chinese renminbi is pegged against a basket of currencies instead of the usd, our results
suggest that the de facto regime remains a pegged regime with the usd as its anchor. While
ocial statements have been made about gradually increasing 
exibility, after July 2005, this is
not observed in the estimates. The experiment with slightly greater 
exibility ran from 22 July
2005 till 6 February 2009. After this, the R2 reverted back to pre 2005 levels of 1.00 and the
renminbi is back to being pegged to the usd. The R2 has remained in the range of 0.93 and 1
through the entire period.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 1992-08-21 0.99 0.97 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.04
(48.36) (-0.40) (-1.10) (-0.53)
2 1992-08-28 1993-06-18 0.93 0.89 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.19
(15.17) (0.46) (-0.15) (1.61)
3 1993-06-25 1995-06-02 0.99 1.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(69.29) (0.89) (-1.25) (-1.04)
4 1995-06-09 2005-07-15 1.00 1.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(1744.90) (1.38) (-0.37) (1.35)
5 2005-07-22 2009-02-06 0.97 0.95 0.05 0.00 -0.00 0.05
(57.65) (1.57) (0.03) (-0.18)
6 2009-02-13 2009-12-25 1.00 0.99 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00
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19A.3 Malaysia
The Malaysian Ringgit was a long standing peg to the usd since 1995, with brief spells of 
exibility
between December 1993 and June 1994, and during the Asian nancial crisis. The R2 was close
to 1.00 in both periods of in
exibility, before and after the crisis. In 2005 the ringgit became
more 
exible on the day that the Chinese exchange rate regime also changed. Unlike the Chinese
case, the Malaysian R2 dropped all the way to 0.81. There has been no change in the currency
regime in the global nancial crisis.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 1993-12-10 0.95 0.86 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.15
(31.78) (0.20) (3.15) (1.35)
2 1993-12-17 1994-06-10 0.40 1.27 0.22 -0.95 -0.59 1.36
(3.50) (0.46) (-1.82) (-2.20)
3 1994-06-17 1997-07-04 0.94 0.94 0.11 -0.05 0.09 0.12
(28.27) (1.73) (-1.43) (3.91)
4 1997-07-11 1998-12-04 0.23 0.02 0.38 0.67 0.17 3.56
(0.07) (0.82) (2.27) (1.55)
5 1998-12-11 2005-07-15 1.00 1.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(1748.91) (-0.42) (1.19) (-0.36)
6 2005-07-22 2009-12-25 0.81 0.74 0.27 0.02 -0.08 0.31
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20A.4 India
The de jure exchange regime for the Indian rupee is that of a managed 
oat since 1994. However,
regression results for India suggest that there has been a cycle of in
exibility and greater 
exibility,
with ve distinct breaks in the exchange rate regime. There was a long period of peg to the
usd with an R2 of 0.84 till January 1994. The rupee value went back to a hard peg to the usd,
taking the R2 of 1 till February 1995. Since then there has been greater 
exibility in the rupee
with both the beta coecient on the usd and the eur being signicant. The rupee appears to
have moved to a basket peg since April 2004 and on 23 March 2007, a further move towards

exibility came about. There are substantial dierences between this history of the exchange
rate regime, when compared with ocial statements and dates.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 1994-01-28 0.84 0.94 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.45
(19.52) (0.12) (-0.11) (-1.03)
2 1994-02-04 1995-02-24 1.00 1.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.01
(77.35) (-3.14) (-1.11) (1.79)
3 1995-03-03 1998-08-21 0.71 0.85 0.08 -0.00 0.08 0.52
(13.22) (0.68) (-0.04) (2.08)
4 1998-08-28 2004-03-19 0.97 0.98 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.06
(67.30) (3.52) (-0.59) (1.32)
5 2004-03-26 2007-03-16 0.86 0.75 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.24
(18.85) (2.04) (1.73) (5.46)
6 2007-03-23 2009-12-25 0.62 0.73 0.34 0.04 -0.12 0.87
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21A.5 Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (hkma) follows a linked exchange rate system whereby the
currency is maintained around HK$ 7.80 to 1 usd within a band of +/-0.05. While the de jure
exchange regime is that of a peg to the usd, the markets have consistently tested the hkma's
intent. Therefore, the breakdates for Hong Kong mark those events in history where intense
upward and downward pressure had to be defended vigorously by the hkma. The coecients on
the usd is measured above 0.98 through all these periods.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 2003-09-19 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(463.96) (2.24) (0.12) (0.85)
2 2003-09-26 2004-03-26 0.98 0.96 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03
(23.33) (-0.57) (0.29) (0.40)
3 2004-04-02 2008-10-24 1.00 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
(227.82) (1.89) (0.66) (3.21)
4 2008-10-31 2009-12-25 1.00 1.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
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22A.6 Indonesia
The Indonesian rupiah exhibited remarkable stability till the Asian crisis. The de jure 
oat
against a basket of major world currencies happened as early as 1978, but in 1997 (during the
Asian Crisis), there was enormous 
exibility in the rupiah with the R2 dropping to 0.03. The
rupiah regime bounced back to an R2 value of 0.35 post October 1999, marking a shift into an
intermediate regime. The rupiah has also moved into a 
oating regime during the global nancial
crisis with an R2 of 0.27.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-11-15 1997-07-11 0.98 0.97 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05
(84.09) (0.65) (1.34) (1.07)
2 1997-07-18 1999-10-08 0.03 0.57 0.24 -0.32 -0.05 17.81
(1.24) (0.26) (-0.63) (-0.20)
3 1999-10-15 2002-08-09 0.35 0.77 0.75 -0.11 0.17 4.43
(4.28) (2.50) (-0.53) (1.33)
4 2002-08-16 2008-10-03 0.64 0.70 0.29 0.16 0.10 0.83
(13.66) (2.54) (2.57) (1.96)
5 2008-10-10 2009-12-25 0.27 0.55 0.38 0.10 0.03 4.67






















1995 2000 2005 2010
23A.7 Philippines
The Philippine Peso had signicant level of 
exibility until November 1995 after which, till the
Asian crisis, the R2 value suggests a de facto peg to the usd. As with other peers in the region,
considerable 
exibility can be observeed during the Asian crisis. Despite being one of the two
Asian economies to have adopted in
ation targeting, and a de jure 
oat of the peso, the value of
the peso is still anchored on the usd with the eur cocient weakly signicant.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-11-15 1995-03-24 0.50 0.77 0.29 0.08 0.03 2.23
(7.53) (1.42) (0.82) (0.25)
2 1995-03-31 1995-12-29 0.96 1.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.14
(11.71) (0.47) (-0.38) (-0.41)
3 1996-01-05 1997-07-04 1.00 0.98 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
(107.78) (-0.18) (1.92) (2.22)
4 1997-07-11 1999-01-15 0.36 0.97 0.05 -0.37 0.33 3.39
(3.83) (0.12) (-1.32) (3.45)
5 1999-01-22 2000-10-06 0.87 0.93 0.21 -0.00 0.00 0.33
(14.65) (1.48) (-0.01) (0.05)
6 2000-10-13 2001-08-17 0.58 1.11 0.17 -0.56 0.11 1.70
(5.41) (0.43) (-2.39) (0.69)
7 2001-08-24 2007-02-23 0.84 0.89 0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.30
(27.88) (0.41) (-1.04) (2.03)
8 2007-03-02 2009-12-25 0.69 0.83 0.25 0.06 -0.09 0.88
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24A.8 Singapore
The Singapore Dollar follows, de jure, a band basket crawl regime, with the Monetary Authority
of Singapore (mas) managing the value of the Singapore dollar according to a basket of currencies.
The weights in the basket are not publicly disclosed, and the weights seen in our exchange rate
analysis may hence be of interest. The breaks in the regime suggested by our methodology points
to the signicant decisions by the mas to change the slope or the width of the band within which
the Singapore dollar is maintained. The Asian crisis did not have a signicant impact on the sgd
as the mas eectively curbed any oshore trading of the Singapore Dollar. The coecient on the
eur has risen since August 2007 and is signicant.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 1997-07-11 0.92 0.78 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.15
(39.03) (3.96) (0.24) (5.47)
2 1997-07-18 1998-10-16 0.22 -0.02 0.32 0.31 0.24 1.28
(-0.12) (1.03) (1.69) (3.44)
3 1998-10-23 2001-10-12 0.85 0.77 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.32
(16.18) (1.55) (0.51) (3.30)
4 2001-10-19 2007-08-10 0.89 0.60 0.22 0.04 0.23 0.12
(29.50) (4.17) (1.64) (11.26)
5 2007-08-17 2009-12-25 0.82 0.59 0.29 0.07 -0.02 0.26
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25A.9 Thailand
The decision to 
oat the Thai baht took place during the Asian Crisis. Though the Bank of
Thailand had a two-tier currency market with separate exchange rates for oshore and onshore
currency transactions, this was unied in January 1998. Like other Asian currencies, the Thai
baht also exhibited enormous 
exibility (with an R2 of 0.11) during the Asian Crisis. The Thai
Baht, thereafter, has been a managed 
oat with the usd as its main anchor and has not witnessed
change during the global nancial crisis.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 1994-03-04 0.97 0.86 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.07
(46.92) (1.03) (1.19) (4.61)
2 1994-03-11 1997-05-09 0.99 0.89 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.02
(76.79) (0.61) (-0.42) (10.31)
3 1997-05-16 1998-09-25 0.11 -0.21 -0.23 0.09 0.47 4.62
(-0.59) (-0.37) (0.27) (2.59)
4 1998-10-02 2001-04-20 0.70 0.83 0.28 -0.11 0.15 1.01
(9.63) (1.73) (-1.00) (3.47)
5 2001-04-27 2009-12-25 0.77 0.67 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.41
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26A.10 Taiwan
The de jure 
exible exchange rate system was adopted in 1979, with an added clause that when
the market is disrupted by seasonal or irregular factors, the Central Bank of the Republic of China
(Taiwan) (CBC) will step in. In essence, our methodology captures the nuanced statement from
the cbc with a peg on the usd before the Asian crisis, and a peg with greater 
exibility after the
Asian Crisis. Since the global crisis, the coecient on the eur has risen from 0.13 in the previous
period to 0.19 tilting the balance within the basket to the usd and eur.
Start End R2 usd dur gbp jpy Variance
1 1991-01-11 1996-06-28 0.94 0.89 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.15
(42.43) (0.04) (1.50) (4.22)
2 1996-07-05 1997-07-25 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02
(31.65) (1.08) (0.93) (0.56)
3 1997-08-01 1998-10-30 0.44 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.99
(3.47) (0.66) (1.14) (4.12)
4 1998-11-06 2008-01-25 0.88 0.78 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.20
(37.47) (2.96) (2.00) (6.79)
5 2008-02-01 2009-12-25 0.84 0.80 0.19 0.00 -0.10 0.34
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